powdermonkey

Does your Fed, State, Local CIO/CTO know how to code?

I think we've reached the point where we can no longer have federal, defense, state or local Chief Information Officiers much less Chief Technology Officers who can't develop, inspect, compile, deploy or run modern software and source code from scratch. 

And I don't mean they did it a while ago on punch cards or remember how bad Fortan was. No we need CIOs and CTOs who can standup a VM, a server, create a cloud and even run DevOps. 

They don't need to be crazy in depth coders, but they have to still be playing around with code and even better have commits or bug reports on some open source projects. I just think with how fast technologies are moving a CIO/CTO has to have one foot planted firmly in tech land and the other in policy or the other core part of the business so that they can call BS on tech when they see it. This would probably mean moving younger folk into these positions, which isn't a bad thing. 

SEE: JFDI as an example of folks I'm talking about

Agree, disagree? why?

If we don’t want to be like the Iranians and get Stuxnetted, take these 4 steps

Thanks to Tom Ricks for allowing me to post on his blog a short piece:

If we don’t want to be like the Iranians and get Stuxnetted, take these 4 steps

It's Wednesday, and that means another story about the looming threat of cyberattack, how vulnerable the United States and its infrastructure is, how bad the Chinese are, how to retaliate, etc. But what seems to be left out of the discussion is what can practically be done about it (beyond scolding bad people). 

The first thing that should be done is to shrink surface area for attack. What does this mean? Right now the U.S. government and industry runs a pretty homogenous set of operating systems and applications that have shown to be a big part of the problem; specifically, Microsoft and Adobe are two companies whose wares have become amazing attack vectors. Why? For a few reasons: 1) if you want to create a virus/exploit weapon you tailor one for largest adoption, 2) attack large morphing code bases that give rise to known-unknown software vulnerabilities, and 3) updates don't always filter out in time once new vulnerabilities are detected and patched.

A great example is how Stuxnet is reported to have entered the Iranian nuclear program: 

The main (and initial) infection vector is the transmission of the Stuxnet malware via USB devices: if an infected USB device is inserted into a clean PC and later accessed with the Windows Explorer, then the infection of that PC is triggered. This is due to either a malicious ‘Autorun.inf' file present on the USB device (for the oldest variants of Stuxnet) or to the usage of the ‘LNK' Windows vulnerability (MS10-046,CERT-IST/AV-2010.313 advisory) for the variants found in June 2010.

The Iranians were probably running older versions of Microsoft operating system software that wasn't updated (and was probably pirated to boot). Further, the Iranians were a victim of Microsoft's business model of stitching together source code to lock-in users and conversely lock-out other software, which allowed the virus carte blanche access to anything. 

So what should we, the government, or private companies for that matter, do? First thing, we've got to get our own house in order to limit our vulnerabilities (or "know thyself," to paraphrase Sun Tzu).

• First, get rid of software for which we have to continually make excuses. Just as the U.S. military doesn't promote smugglers (Han Solo) and farm boys (Luke Skywalker) to general, stop deploying software that requires additional fixes and comes stitched together. Microsoft and Adobe might be less expensive software, but if it leaves a backdoor open, is it really "cheaper"?

• Second, only install operating systems and applications where the source code is available for widespread public inspection. Keeping source code secret increases its widespread vulnerability to exploitation when a defect is detected.

• Third, increase heterogeneity of operating systems and applications to create gaps so that a virus/exploit can't transverse between different systems.

• Fourth, fund research into more secure operating systems and make the fruits of that investment public: A rising tide lifts all (security) boats. A small investment in maturing source code can have a large impact. 

 

 

 

my WSJ OpEd: Arthur Herman & John Scott: Send in the Tech Reinforcements

first WSJ oped: 

By ARTHUR HERMAN 
AND JOHN SCOTT

Today's Pentagon is losing its most important battle, the one for its own future. The Defense Department's latest evaluation report on the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter reveals how badly that fight is going, and why.

There have been many stories about the F-35 Lightning II's problems and delays, and its looming total price tag of $1 trillion, up from prior estimates of $331 billion and $177 billion before that. Still, the DOD's Jan. 14 report zeroes in on the key issue: software and information technology.

All five software "blocks"—systems to take the plane from testing to full production—that Lockheed Martin is contracted to develop for the Lightning II are behind schedule and over budget. The testing of software for producing F-35s won't get done until 2017. Any new glitches that are found will likely delay deployment even longer.

The fault, however, doesn't lie with Lockheed Martin, or even with the F-35.

The problem is how the Pentagon goes about acquiring the IT and software that modern weapons systems need. If this problem doesn't get fixed, any hope of building a 21st-century American military will be doomed.

The complexity of the software that the F-35 fighter needs is staggering, almost incomprehensible. It runs to almost 10 million lines of software source code. The man in charge of the F-35 program, Maj. Gen. Chris Bogdan, has been quoted as saying about thesoftware, "it scares the heck out of me"—because he knows in the world of high tech, complexity is the enemy of effectiveness.

Reuters/Lockheed Martin

The U.S. Marine Corps version of Lockheed Martin's F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, F-35B test aircraft BF-2 flies with external weapons.

Yet that's the dilemma the Pentagon faces every day when it comes to IT and software.

For example, the Air Force's Oracle -based Expeditionary Combat Support System was supposed to be ready in October 2013. Having spent $1 billion already, it needed another $1 billion just to get to one-quarter functionality by 2020. ECCS was supposed to automate the Air Force's management of parts and equipment. This inherent complexity of the acquisitions process effectively killed ECCS and led to the rampant cost overruns that also killed the Navy's DDG1000 destroyer late last year.

The Pentagon acquires IT and software-based systems the way it buys aircraft carriers—as if they were physical items to be forged or welded or mass-produced. The standard procurement cycle is geared around multiyear milestones and intensive evaluation reviews that can take months or years.

The modern software development cycle, by contrast, moves in weeks, days and even hours—because software is a malleable digital item whose only limits are the human imagination.

In addition, the Pentagon relies on a bureaucratic review process that demands contractors anticipate and resolve problems in advance. Every software engineer, however, knows that's not possible or even desirable.

Modern software constantly evolves. Engineers know that repeated test cycles in small portions at a time work best. Designers can learn from mistakes and glitches embedded in initial and early versions, and they can learn as well from early users of these versions.

More important, designers can take advantage of technologies that are unknown today but emerge later on. Learning by trial and error doesn't work so well for aircraft carriers or Abrams tanks, but it is crucial for the development of effective software.

The DOD's current acquisition strategy hasn't caught up or caught on. By treating software as if it were a product instead of a process, our military services are shutting themselves off from the kind of cost-efficient innovation that rules in the commercial software and IT industries. Amazon, for example, can make over 30 changes a week to its portal, from adding simple code changes to new complex features, without a major glitch. Our service personnel know this only too well, when they see how their children's videogames work better and have more sophisticated apps than the electronic gear they have to use in the field—and at a fraction of the cost.

The Pentagon has tried to go around the problem by buying off-the-shelf software for some systems. But that only postpones the inevitable frustration when it comes time to design software that can integrate those commercial products into warfighting systems. This is what happened when the Air Force tried to create the Expeditionary Combat Support System, which ended up as a $2 billion boondoggle.

Instead, the Pentagon needs a modern software and IT acquisition process that's as flexible, agile and open-ended as software itself—one that's geared for Moore's Law (computing power doubles every 18 months) and Butter's Law (network capacity costs get halved every nine months) instead of Murphy's Law.

Until we do, expect more messes like the F-35 and DDG 1000—which we ultimately can't afford and our fighting men and women ultimately won't survive.

Mr. Herman is the author of "Freedom's Forge: How American Business Produced Victory in World War Two" (Random House, 2012). Mr. Scott is a senior system engineer for Radiant Blue Technologies and co-wrote "Open Technology Development: Lessons Learned and Best Practices for Military Software" (Department of Defense, 2011).

A version of this article appeared Feb. 12, 2013, on page A15 in some U.S. editions of The Wall Street Journal, with the headline: Send in the Tech Reinforcements.

 

Issa IT reform bill now w/ Open Source Sec 405.

very interesting langauge in the new IT Reform Bill, on open source software:

Sept 6, 2012, HR ___ Disscusion Draft 

SEC. 405. PROMOTION OF GOVERNMENT-WIDE SUPPORT FOR THE USE AND

DEVELOPMENT OF OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE.

(a) PURPOSE.—The purpose of this section is to promote the use and

collaborative development of open source software within the Federal government.

(b) STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES.—Section 11302(d) of title 40, United

States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: “The standards and

guidelines shall include those necessary to enable effective adoption of open

source software.”

(c) GUIDANCE.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of

this Act, the Director, in consultation with the Chief Information Officers Council,

shall issue guidance for the use and collaborative development of open source

software within the Federal government.

(d) MATTERS COVERED.—In issuing guidance under subsection (c), the

Director shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(1) Guidance to clarify that the preference for commercial items in

section 3307 of title 41, United States Code, includes all open source

software that meets the definition of commercial item in section 103 of

title 40, United State Code, including all such software that is used for

non-Government purposes and is licensed to the public.

(2) Guidance regarding the conduct of market research to ensure

the inclusion of open source software.

(3) Guidance to establish a program to educate the acquisition

workforce by providing information to identify and counter

misconceptions about open source software and to keep such

information updated.

(4) Guidance to define Government-wide standards for security,

redistribution, indemnity, and copyright in the acquisition, use, release,

and collaborative development of open source software.

(5) Guidance for the establishment of a Government approval

process to qualify open source software for widespread Government

use, addressing issues such as security and redistribution rights.

(6) Guidance to establish standard service level agreements for

maintenance and support for open source software products widely

adopted by the Government, as well as the development of

Government-wide agreements that contain standard and widely

applicable contract provisions for ongoing maintenance and

development of open source software.

(7) Guidance on the role and use of the Federal Commodity

Information Technology Acquisition Center, established pursuant to

section 11501 of title 40, United States Code (as added by section 302),

for acquisition of open source software.

(e) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than 2 years after the issuance of the

guidance required by subsection (b), the Comptroller General of the United States

shall submit to the relevant congressional committees a report containing—

(1) an assessment of the effectiveness of the guidance;

(2) an identification of barriers to widespread use by the Federal

Government of open source software; and

(3) such legislative recommendations as the Comptroller General

considers appropriate to further the purposes of this section.

 

Someone Doesn't like Accumulo

Someone doesn't like Accumulo. And by the looks of it they are very well versed in the language of open source software (OSS).

Back ground: Accumulo was recently released as OSS to the Apache foundation and has to do with securoty features using a cloud architecture. What was interesting is that NSA funded, created and released it to build a community around these features that they wanted. 

Let the guessing begin on who put this in...

Department of Defense use of National Security Agency
cloud computing database and intelligence community
cloud computing infrastructure and services (sec. 929)
The committee recommends a provision that would prohibit the
use of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Accumulo cloud computing database by other Department of Defense (DOD) components after September 30, 2013, unless the Chief Information Officer certifies that there are no viable commercial open source databases that have the security features of Accumulo, or that
Accumulo itself has become a successful open source database
project. The provision also would require that Department of Defense and intelligence community officials coordinate fully on the
use by DOD components of cloud computing infrastructure and
services offered by the intelligence community for purposes other
than intelligence analysis to ensure consistency with the DOD information technology efficiencies initiative, data center and server
consolidation plans, and cybersecurity plans and policies.
The committee applauds NSA’s decision to adopt open source architectures and software for most of its cloud computing development. However, the committee disagrees with NSA’s decision to develop its own cloud computing database—called Accumulo—rather
than adapt an open source version of the Google BigTable product.
The committee understands that NSA decided to build a government solution several years ago because the open source systems
lacked security features that NSA considers essential. In hindsight,
the committee believes it would have been smarter for NSA to have
worked with industry and the open source community to add NSA’s
security features to the open source database systems. Indeed, the
committee believes that NSA should pursue that course now.
The downside of using a government-unique database is that,
compared to open source products, there will be far fewer developers contributing to technology advances, and all of the applications, analytic tools, and functionality that the open source community and commercial industry are developing for cloud computing
will not be compatible or interoperable with the NSA database, depriving the government of valuable innovation. The committee believes it is very likely that the rapidly expanding and innovating
cloud computing industry will pass NSA by in a hurry, with lagging performance and higher costs. The consequences would not be
confined to NSA, since the Army intelligence community has already adopted the NSA cloud architecture, and NSA is strongly
urging the entire Department of Defense to do likewise. One of
NSA’s arguments is that the security features of Accumulo are essential for the cybersecurity of DOD as a whole.
NSA is making an effort to heal its divergence from the open
source community by proposing Accumulo as an open source project
under the Apache Foundation as a competitor to existing Apache
Foundation open source databases like HBase and Cassandra,
which are widely used and supported in industry.
The committee believes it is important to ensure that there are
options available if Accumulo does not in fact become a viable and
widely supported open source project. The committee is aware of
commercial interest in the cell-level data tagging security features
that NSA built into Accumulo. These features should be as useful
to industry clients who need to protect and control access to the
data resident in cloud facilities as they are to the intelligence community and DOD.
If Accumulo is successful, or if the commercial open source community produces nothing comparable to Accumulo’s security features, this provision would permit Accumulo to be used in DOD
outside of NSA. But if Accumulo is not an open source success, and
if industry follows NSA’s security lead, the Department should use
a commercial product. This provision would give NSA almost 2
years since it made the Accumulo open source proposal to Apache
to succeed. The deadline in this provision is also sufficiently distant
to enable DOD components and industry to plan accordingly.
Under the direction of the Director of National Intelligence, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and NSA are planning to provide
cloud infrastructure and software ‘‘as a service’’ to all of the intelligence community. As noted, NSA is offering a government implementation of open source standards. CIA is offering a competitively
awarded commercial solution. These cloud services would cover all
manner of computing needs and capabilities, not just intelligence
analysis. This provision is also intended to ensure that DOD components’ use of these cloud services is consistent with DOD information technology policies and plans. The committee notes that the
software services that the CIA may offer to DOD customers could
include analytic databases like HBase and Cassandra, and other
commercial open source products, potentially providing an alternative to Accumulo.

Transparency & Failure in .Gov/.Mil IT

Recently at the Gov 2.0 summit Fed CIO Viveck Kundra talked about stopping/killing some very expensive .gov IT programs, video here:

Gov 2.0 Summit 2010: Aneesh Chopra and Vivek Kundra, "Closing the Technology Gap"

But I was left wondering what were the programs and more over why killed? Oftentimes federal (and military) IT programs will be killed or left to die, without a postmortem or documeting lessons learned. Sometimes an intrepid reporter will try to one, but that usually just scratches the surface. GAO or internal Government offices will sometimes do them if asked to by Congress, but GAO reports are usually only for the largest of the large failing programs. .Gov internal reports are usually not published or done, much less published.

Its always struck me as weird that the government doesn't push more of a lessons learned culture like the one ingrained in the military (but sadly not in the military IT field). We do this for plane crashes, but there doesn't seem to be a systematic process for documenting IT failure?

(if there is please post)

I'm hoping that Viveck and Team can come up with some sort of simplified lessons learned document, this would do a few things:

1. Put government / contractors on notice that failure will be documented, like Gunnar says "The gov doesn't look good Naked" but it might be in better shape if it was

2. Learn, Learn, Learn: doomed to repeat mistakes if we don't learn

3. Gather requirements for potential changes in process, law, promotion schedules, etc. IF need be

A lessons learned doc should include: original cost of program (estimate and contractor proposed), original period of performance, winning contractor team, dollars spent, government intellectual property developed, reasons for cancellation, etc. I'd put a floor on the study and get a small team 2-3 weeks to prepare a doc, maybe only document failure under $ xx millions?

Or maybe this would be better as a wiki somewhere?

thoughts? unworkable? makes folks too uncomfortable?

Mil-OSS working group 2 wrap-up

(first published on www.opensource.com) Mil-OSS working group 2 wrap-up

Openness in the military is coming of-age, as was evident to the attendees at the 2nd Military Open Source Software (Mil-OSS) working group held August 3-5 in Arlington, Virginia. This grassroots gathering of practitioners in the art/science of creating military capabilities was unique in its inclusive atmosphere of government civilians, military uniformed (and retired) personnel, government contractors, and university academics. All gathered with one goal: how to more rapidly create and deploy military capabilities utilizing open source software for the U.S. Soldier, Sailor, Airman, and Marine.

What was interesting was a shift from the attitude at last years meeting of: "We can use open source software in the military?" to this years vibe of "How can we use, modify, sustain, and create more open source software around the military?" In the last year, since the update of DoD Open Source policy (see the 2009 DoD Open Source Memo), there has been an important shift in understanding that the benefits of being open vastly outweigh the hassles and foibles of closed and gated source code development--especially when the U.S. taxpayer is picking up the tab. Roadblock issues were brought up, such as:

- What are the best practices for how to run unclassified code communities for a classified client?

- How do we create, fund, and sustain development of open source?

- How do we generate more ideas on how to fix and deal with the government's acquisition system?

The military-focused OSS projects in attendance ran the gamut, from the long-established computer-aided design project BRL-CAD, to cyber (Suricata), modeling and simulation (Delta3D), geospatial (OMAR & OSSIM), and new projects such as EurekaStreams and the to-be-released Analysis of Competing Hypotheses. Presenters and the three tracks were almost too numerous; see MIL-OSS 2 Agenda for details.

The kickoff keynote was Lt. General Elder (retired), who reviewed cyber issues facing the military (video). Subsequent military keynotes discussed internal military community collaboration (Lt. Col. Allen of MilSuite), an update on the need to simplify information technologies acquisitions and deployment processes in the military (Maj. Neushul - Update on Keeping it Stupid Stupid), and a review of the current state of OSS in the DoD (Dan Risacher - DoD OSS Review).

Defensive Homeland security, OSS, and cyber issues were reviewed by Doug Maughan of DHS (Homeland Open Security Technologies) and contrasted by HD Moore of Rapid7/Metasploit who went over Open Source Cyber Weaponry.

Most presentations can be found on Slideshare at Mil-OSS WG2 Meeting. Selected presenters can be found on Vimeo.

A great addition at lunch were the many Ignite sessions, such as Gunnar Hellekson's "Fighting Forks [in DoD]" and Maj. Neushul's talk about the need for a functioning Combat Relevant Position Location Information (CRPLI) capability for the Marines.

An unexpected shout-out for WG2 came from Wired's Dangerroom (Noah Shachtman) who interviewed presenter Mathew Burton on his soon-to-be-released open source project: Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, which is "a system for organizing information that would help analysts think about complex problems more objectively, even when confronted with mountains of evidence." He called it Analysis of Competing Hypotheses, or ACH.

The ball seems to be rolling on releasing or converting military or intelligence source code as pure open source software.

By the third day, it was time for something unplanned: Barcamp, which basically split into two groups: projects and process. Project discussions included CRPLI and the Ozone Widget Framework (being used by the DoD Storefront project). The process track was mainly focused on issues around how to use, develop, and sustain OSS projects tied to the military.

A challenge was issued at the barcamp lunch in response to the need for a canonical set of briefing charts detailing the value of open source software for the military, from security to basic definitions to legal issues. All-in-all, about 100 briefing charts were created and will soon be made available to the community to use/modify/tweak as needed.

Future of Mil-OSS

The future of software in the military was a much discussed and argued topic, but one key issue agreed upon by all was the continued need for community building and collaboration. There was consensus for a Mil-OSS large annual gathering coupled with regional grassroots meetings and/or barcamps. There are rumors of proposed camps in Boston, New Orleans, Charleston, and San Diego. Join the Mil-OSS Google Group to track their progress.

A few reference links for the uninitiated:

• Website: www.mil-oss.org
• Mil-OSS WG2 presentations - http://www.slideshare.net/event/miloss-2/slideshows
• Mil-OSS WG2 videos - http://vimeo.com/channels/miloss
• Mil-OSS WG mailing list
• Mil-OSS LinkedIn group
• twitter hashtag: #miloss

Thanks to our amazing sponsors. We really couldn't have put on a great show without you!

And a big thanks to Georgia Tech Research Institute, especially  Josh Davis and Claire Gould, for doing the truly thankless back (breaking) office work of coordinating everything!

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NEW GUIDANCE ON OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE

As a Marine friend says "Agility is the Capability" - open source software and methods is the enabler of this.

The DoD CIO office (or ASD-NII) just has posted new open source software guidance for the whole Department of Defense! Only took about 18 months to get through, so worth it. Hopefully this puts the FUD to bed.

Definitively open source software can be used inside the US Dept. of Defense. This is great news and shows that DoD is heading in the right direction to change how information intensive technology acquisitions programs can move toward a more dynamic OODA loop like model.

The entire policy is here: October 16 2009, Open Source Software Guidance Memo, text as follow:

To effectively achieve its missions, the Department of Defense must develop and
update its software-based capabilities faster than ever, to anticipate new threats and
respond to continuously changing requirements. The use of Open Source Software
(OSS) can provide advantages in this regard.

Doc Download 2009OSS

Make Love not CyberWar

Been thinking allot about cyberwar and the orgy of funds raining down upon the tribes of defense contractors and I got to wondering, why fight a war you can't win.

Now try to follow me: the US made it a central part of our national strategy to own the skies, I think the last soldier to die from an air to ground strike was in the Korean conflict. So we spent the funds, developed the tech, trained the pilots and can now pretty much own the sky above any country we want to. We decided that we didn't want any competition in the air and wanted to take away that option from any military.

So cyberwar: we are going to attempt to do the same things, spend the funds, develop the tech, do the training, etc. and we'll own the net. BUT of course the net is this large amorphous blob of foreign governments, public and private entities that don't like to take direction from a central source. In effect we can never own the sky. In this case the lessons learned of 'rule the skys' doesn't work and never will because you can never bound the problem of cyberwar. So what to do?

Don't fight a cyberwar by making sure no one else can either.

Most cyberwar exploits weaknesses in existing technologies (servers not protected, patches not installed, bad security, bad archtecture (internet issues), etc.), so turn that technology that deters cyberwar into a commidity for all to use, make it better and move on.

It's a bit counterintuitive but if you can't bound the problem then you will be constantly in the mode of 'wack a mole' hiting this and that group of nitwits or worse state sponsored folks looking to disrupt things. Or the ole Pearl Harbour attack, etc. This would entail pushing open source software, making it better and publishing it for all (yes including the baddies) to use.

So don't fight this war you can't win or at least make it really hard to see any results fast. Over time the systems should get better so that you can trace back a cyber attack and then drop a bomb on them since we own the sky.

What Open (should) Mean in the Military

Open means having access.

In the Dept. of Defense we need to ensure/create/enable open access to tax-payer funded technology, period.

Tax-payer funded software development needs to be openly available to all (except for really classified stuff). This means that we will need to figure out the acquisitions mechanisms needed to ensure that the intellectual property is made available to the defense industry and ultimately the tax-payer.

The inclusion of open source software into National Security Systems has jumped the chasm and shown the path. Military OSS products such as Delta3D, BRL-CAD, OSSIM, (and many many more) and of course Open Solaris and RedHat have shown the path for deployment of software systems, now we need to make the institutional default.

Prediction: 18 months from now this will be standard.

Let me know if you want to help.